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5.1  Introduction 
The soaring cost of medical care for the elderly has imposed a sizable bur- 
den on society. In 1992 average health care expenditures for those aged 65 
or over were $9,125, compared to $2,349 for those under age 65 (American 
Federation of Aging Research and Alliance for Aging Research 1995). For the 
elderly, much of the cost results from long-term care. In  1989, 77 percent of 
Medicaid funding directed toward those aged 65 or over was spent on nursing 
homes or home health care. 
Policymakers have devised various strategies to combat these growing ex- 
penditures. Governor Pataki of  New York  State has proposed drastic cuts in 
spending for home health care and housekeeping services, in an effort to bal- 
ance the state’s budget. President Clinton has taken the opposite approach, pro- 
posing expanded home services as a substitute for more expensive nursing 
homes (Lewin-VHI, Inc. 1993). To evaluate the potential impacts of such poli- 
cies, we  need a clear understanding of  the use and provision of home health 
care.’ Who are the preferred caregivers? How much substitution is there be- 
tween formal and informal care? Will increasing the availability and affordabil- 
ity of home health care decrease more expensive nursing home admissions and 
therefore costs, or will the substitution away from unpaid care toward formal 
paid care be large enough to offset any savings? 
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Angeles, and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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1. Throughout the paper I will use the terms “home health care” and “home care” interchange- 
ably. In a strict sense home health care refers to medically related services while home care refers 
to housekeeping services. 
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Underlying these issues is the larger question of what drives transfers be- 
tween family members. Much has been written about the magnitude of finan- 
cial transfers made between generations (Gale and Scholz 1994; Kotlikoff and 
Summers 1981; McGarry and Schoeni 1997). Are the resources we  observe 
flowing between parents and children given for altruistic reasons or are they 
made as part of  an exchange? By  considering the possibility that home care 
is provided in exchange for financial compensation, I will begin to address 
this issue. 
This paper takes advantage of the new survey of the Asset and Health Dy- 
namics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) to document the current use of home 
health care by  the population aged 70 or over. It expands on past work in this 
subject by exploring the role played by financial compensation from parents to 
children as a method of encouraging children to provide care, and by control- 
ling more completely for factors such as income and wealth that may  affect 
access to services. 
In section 5.2 I describe the data in more detail, in particular pointing out the 
advantages of AHEAD in addressing these issues. Section 5.3 presents some 
descriptive statistics for the sample and for the measures of impairment I use 
in  the remainder of  the paper. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 analyze the receipt and 
provision  of  care  in  a  multivariate  framework. A  final  section concludes 
and offers directions for future research. 
5.2  Data 
AHEAD is a longitudinal survey of individuals born in 1923 or earlier and 
their spouses or partners. Baseline interviews were completed in the fall of 
1993 when respondents were approximately 70 years old or older. The second 
wave of interviews is scheduled to be administered in the fall of  1995. Thus, 
at the time of this writing, only cross-sectional information is available. 
AHEAD is unique in providing a large nationally representative sample of 
older Americans.* The survey contains detailed questions on income, assets, 
health, as well as a good deal of information on each of the respondent’s chil- 
dren. The breadth of  the survey allows for improvements over past studies of 
the provision of  home health care. A respondent’s financial resources can be 
carefully controlled for along with the presence or absence of health insurance. 
Thus it will be possible to examine how  the choice of  paid or unpaid care 
varies with the ability to pay.  Similarly detailed health indicators allow for 
precise measurement of impairment. As described below, the survey collects 
information on limitations with respect to specific activities of  daily living 
(ADLs) and instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs), as well as on the 
2. Individuals in heavily black and Hispanic areas and residents of  Florida were oversampled. 
Population comparisons therefore require weighting. With the exception of  the regressions that 
control for race, the results reported in this paper are based on weighted observations. 135  Caring for the Elderly: The Role of Adult Children 
existence of  specific diseases, overall health measures, and service use. The 
information available on the number of children the respondent has, the child‘s 
geographic distance from the respondent, his employment status, family in- 
come or earnings, and the number of  own children (grandchildren to the re- 
spondent) will help explain the choice of  informal home care arrangements 
and the distribution of responsibility across siblings. 
The entire sample consists of 8,224  individual^.^ From this original sample 
I exclude 132 respondents for whom the interview is incomplete, bringing the 
sample size down to 8,092.4 Many of these elderly have health problems: 35 
percent report themselves to be in fair or poor health, 22 percent have been 
hospitalized in the past year, and 89 percent have been to the doctor in the past 
year, with the average number of office visits just over five. 
Respondents are asked  whether  they  are limited  with  respect  to certain 
ADLs or IADLs, and whether they receive assistance with these tasks. In gen- 
eral, ADLs are personal care items while IADLs relate to housekeeping tasks. 
The six ADLs are walking across a room, dressing, bathing, eating, getting in 
or out of bed, and toileting. The five IADLs are preparing meals, grocery shop- 
ping, using the phone, taking  medication,  and managing  money. The ADL 
questions are of the form 
Does anyone ever help you bathe or shower? 
Do you get that help most of the time, some of the time, or only occasion- 
ally? 
Do you have any difficulty bathing (even when someone helps yodwithout 
help)? 
Who most often helps you bathe? 
Similar questions are asked with respect to the other ADLs. Individuals are 
coded as having an ADL limitation if  they state that they get help, they use 
equipment (for walking and getting in or out of bed), they have difficulty with 
the task, or they do not do the activity for health reasons; 28.9 percent of re- 
spondents were limited with respect to at least one ADL. 
The IADL questions are similar: 
Are you able to prepare hot meals without help? 
Is that because of a health problem? 
Without help do you have any difficulty preparing meals? 
Who most often helps you? 
Who else most often helps you? 
Again respondents are coded as having difficulty with an IADL if they needed 
help or did not do the task because of  a health problem; 29.3 percent of the 
3. These results are based on the “post-alpha” release of AHEAD. 
4.  Although 783 of  the respondents are below the age of 70, I include these individuals in the 
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sample have difficulty with at least one IADL. Forty percent have at least one 
ADL or IADL constraint. The proportion of individuals with various ADL and 
IADL limitations is shown in table 5.1. The most common ADL difficulty is in 
walking. Twenty-three percent of  the entire sample have difficulty walking 
across the room without help or the use of equipment. Thirteen percent have 
difficulty dressing, and 12 percent have difficulty bathing. With respect IADLs, 
almost 18 percent have difficulty handling their finances, and nearly that pro- 
portion have problems with grocery shopping. I also report the proportion with 
various limitations conditional on having at least one ADL or IADL limitation 
(the “impaired  sample”). Of those experiencing difficulty with at least one 
task, 58 percent have difficulty walking across the room, and 44 percent have 
difficulty with grocery shopping. 
The means for variables used in the analysis are shown in table 5.2 for the 
full sample, and separately by  whether the respondent has a limitation. The 
latter two groups differ in the expected ways. The impaired sample is older 
(with a mean age of 79 vs. 75 among the nonimpaired),  more likely to be 
nonwhite (20 percent vs. 13 percent), less likely to be male, and in generally 
worse health. Fifty-six percent of the impaired sample report themselves to be 
in fair or poor health, compared to just 21 percent of the nonimpaired sample. 
Those who require assistance are less well off in terms of both income and 
wealth. Their mean income is $19,073, compared to $26,299 for the healthier 
sample, and mean wealth is $136,379, compared to $214,787. Those who have 
limitations also have a greater number of children living within 10 miles, al- 
though the total number of children does not differ significantly. The impaired 
sample is less likely to be married and more likely to live with an individual 
who is not a spouse, probably because of their need for care. Surprisingly, 82 
percent of the “healthy” sample have private health insurance (typically as a 
Table 5.1  Percentage of Sample with Various ADL and IADL Limitations 
Task 
Percentage of  Percentage of 









































73.6 Table 5.2  Comparison of Means 
Do Not Need 
All Respondents  Need Assistance  Assistance 
n = 8,092’  n = 3,26Ia  n = 4,831’ 









Number of ADL 
limitations 
Number of IADL 
limitations 
Number of nights in 
hospital 
Prob. of living 10 yrsb 
Prob. of entering nursing 
Health measures 
good 







Number of children 
Number of kids in 10 
miles 
Married 




Prob. of leaving 
inheritanceb 
Child(ren) in will 0/1 
Child(ren) on deed to 
home O/I 
Value of home 
Child(ren) beneficiaries 
of life insurance 011 
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Table 5.2  (continued) 
Do Not Need 
All Respondents  Need Assistance  Assistance 
n = 8,092a  n = 3,26Ia  n = 4,831” 
Mean  S.E.  Mean  S.E.  Mean  S.E.  Variable 
Number of kids gave 
$5,OOO+ (past 10 yrs)  0.359  0.009  0.266  0.012  0.420  0.013 
Trust for child(ren) 0/1  0.091  0.003  0.076  0.004  0.101  0.004 
Value of trust  22,808  1,618  13,019  1,407  29,323  2,538 
Number of kids gave 
transfer (last year)  0.378  0.009  0.289  0.012  0.436  0.012 
Total value of transfers 
(last year)  1,304  101  1,028  92.5  1,486  157 
Note: S.E. = standard error. 
‘Number of observations for some variables differs due to missing values. 
bMeans calculated over nonmissing observations. 
supplement to Medicare), compared to 69 percent of the impaired sample. This 
difference could indicate that access to health insurance has a protective effect, 
or perhaps that the decision to purchase insurance is influenced by affordability 
rather than by adverse selection (Hurd and McGarry 1997).5 
The degree of impairment differs along income and wealth lines, perhaps 
indicating a lifetime history of  illness that may  have hindered labor market 
performance. As shown in table 5.3, 44 percent of those in the lowest income 
quartile had at least one ADL limitation, and the mean number of ADL limita- 
tions was  1.11 for this group. In the highest income quartile, 18 percent of 
the population had at least one ADL limitation, and the mean number of such 
limitations was 0.38. The results are similar for the number of IADL limita- 
tions, and for a stratification by wealth rather than income. The respondents in 
the lowest quartiles are more than twice as likely to face difficulties with daily 
tasks as respondents in the highest quartiles. 
5.3  Characteristics of the Impaired Population 
The analyses in the remainder of  the paper are restricted to the sample of 
3,261 individuals with one or more ADL or IADL limitation. 
5. The sample of impaired elderly appears similar to other data sets. See, e.g., Ettner (1994). 
Soldo, Wolf, and Agree (1990), and Stone, Cafferata, and Sang1 (1987), all of  whom use the 
National Long-Term Care Survey (NLTCS), and Mutchler and Bullers (1994), who use the 1984 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). In contrast to the NLTCS, AHEAD collects 
data on all children and household members, thus providing information on potential caregivers. 
AHEAD also provides a substantially larger sample of needy respondents, more detailed informa- 
tion on potential caregivers, and more extensive health information than does SIPP. 139  Caring for the Elderly: The Role of Adult Children 
Table 5.3  ADL and IADL Limitations by Income and Wealth Quartiles 
Quartile 
Limitation  Lowest  2nd  3rd  4th 
ADLs 
Percentage with any 
Mean number 




Percentage with any 
Mean number 
Percentage with any 
Mean number 
Number of  observations' 
IADLs 
By Income 
43.99  32.66 
1.11  0.73 
44.63  3  1.78 
0.93  0.61 
By Wealth 
44.67  3  1.89 
1.15  0.71 
44.67  3  1.26 
1.01  0.56 



















"Quartiles do not each contain 25 percent due  to lumping of observations. 
Table 5.4  Distribution of ADL and IADL Limitations (percent of sample) 
Number of IADL Limitations 
Number of ADL 
Limitations  0  1  2  3  4  5  Total 
-  21.69  4.01  0.97  0.56  0.38  27.59 
18.37  9.27  2.73  1.47  0.49  0.33  32.67 
5.46  4.90  2.48  1.06  0.73  0.50  15.12 
1.73  2.85  2.32  1.26  0.67  0.43  9.25 
0.57  1.61  1.32  1.14  0.59  0.84  6.06 
0.26  0.57  1.09  0.94  0.64  0.87  4.36 
0.02  0.24  0.42  0.63  0.94  2.69  4.94 
Total  26.41  41.12  14.38  7.46  4.61  6.03  100 
Nore: Calculations based on  a sample of  3,261  observations with at least one ADL or IADL limita- 
tion. Numbers may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding. 
5.3.1  Limitations 
Many respondents suffer from multiple problems. The distribution for the 
total number of ADL and IADL limitations for this impaired sample is shown 
in table 5.4. The Clinton health care proposal classified individuals as disabled 
if they suffered three or more ADL limitations (Lewin-VHI, Inc. 1993). One- 
quarter of the individuals in my subsample (or 10 percent of the entire survey 
population) would be so classified. Eighteen percent have difficulty with three 
or more IADLs. Fully 5 percent of this restricted sample have difficulty with 140  Kathleen McGarry 
all ADLs, and 6 percent have difficulty with all IADLs. Close to 3 percent of 
the sample have difficulty with all given activities. 
As one would expect, the existence of various ADL and IADL limitations is 
positively correlated (table 5.5). The largest correlation is between the IADLs 
of using a phone and managing money at 0.56. Among the ADLs, the largest 
correlation is between dressing and bathing at 0.48. The correlations typically 
range from 0.25 to 0.45, and all but the correlation between getting in or out 
of bed and managing money are significant at the 1 percent level. The latter is 
significant at the 1.4 percent level. 
Difficulties with the various tasks are not equally restrictive. Needing a cane 
to cross the room is less of a burden than being unable to bathe without help. 
Similarly, difficulty managing money may be less limiting than difficulty pre- 
paring meals or using a telephone. As is apparent from table 5.5, the correla- 
tions between walking or managing money and the other variables are less 
strong than some of the other correlations. For example, the correlations be- 
tween having difficulty dressing  and difficulty with the other ADLs are all 
larger than those between walking and the same ADLs. 
5.3.2  Caregivers 
When looking at who provides the care, the results from AHEAD should be 
interpreted with some caution. With respect to ADL limitations, respondents 
are asked who “most ojien” helps them walk, dress, and so forth, so that only 
the primary caregiver is obtained for each task. If, for example, two children 
share the caregiving chores, information is only obtained on the one who helps 
most often with each particular task. While the questions are asked with re- 
spect to each ADL, it is generally the case that the same person helps “most 
often” with each task with which the respondent needs assistance. This result 
Table 5.5  Correlations between Limitations 
ADLs  IADLs 
Task  Walk  Dress  Bath  Eat  Bed  Toilet  Meals  Shop  Phone  Med  Money 











0.24  0.28  0.20  0.32  0.22  0.18  0.20 
1.00  0.48  0.37  0.41  0.40  0.35  0.29 
1.00  0.38  0.41  0.38  0.29  0.38 
1.00  0.32  0.39  0.22  0.29 
1.00  0.43  0.30  0.27 
1.00  0.05  0.25 
1.00  0.48 
1  .00 
0.07  0.10  -0.16 
0.22  0.30  0.05 
0.25  0.33  0.11 
0.37  0.41  0.21 
0.21  0.24  0.04 
0.26  0.31  0.12 
0.42  0.45  0.24 
0.27  0.32  0.16 
1.00  0.56  0.26 
1.00  0.33 
1 .OO 
Notes; Calculations based on 3,261 observations with at least one ADL or IADL limitation. Correlations 
are all significant at the 1 percent level except Money*Bed, which is significant at the 1.4  percent level. 141  Caring for the Elderly: The Role of Adult Children 
is to be expected. It would be difficult to imagine a case in which one individ- 
ual helped the respondent get out of bed and a second individual stood by to 
help with dressing or toileting. In fact, of  those who receive help with at least 
one ADL, 84 percent report help from just one caregiver. The questions are 
also problematic in that information on a helper is only obtained if the respon- 
dent receives help “most of the time,” and not if she receives help either “some 
of the time” or “only occasionally.” In the analyses that follow, approximately 
5 percent of the sample receive care, but the source of the care is not obtained. 
The sequence of questions for IADL limitations is similar, but up to two help- 
ers are obtained for each limitation. 
Hours of care provided by each caregiver are also obtained from the respon- 
dent. The total  amount  of  time can be derived from two  questions  in the 
AHEAD survey, although the calculation requires some assumptions. For each 
individual who is listed as providing assistance with an ADL or IADL limita- 
tion, respondents are asked 
How often in the last month did HELPER n help you? (Every day, several 
times a week, about once a week, less than once a week, or not at all) 
Those who responded every day, several times a week, or about once a week 
were asked to report a number of hours per day. Total number of  hours per 
week (or per month) can therefore be calculated. I use the straightforward im- 
putation supplied by the AHEAD staff. For those who helped every day, the 
reported number of hours per day was multiplied by seven. Those who helped 
“several times a week” were assumed to help 3.5 days, and the number of hours 
was multiplied by 3.5. “About once a week” was assumed to mean exactly once 
a week. Those who helped less than once a week, and for whom there is there- 
fore no information on hours, were assumed to provide exactly one hour of 
care per week. Finally, those who did not help in the past month were assigned 
zero hours of care. I did not impute a value if the respondent could not give an 
answer to either the question about number of days or the question about num- 
ber of hours of help.6 
Fortunately, the majority of those in need do receive care. Of the 3,261 re- 
spondents with at least one ADL or IADL limitation, 61 percent (weighted) 
received assistance from a caregiver of some sort. Table 5.6 shows the break- 
down of helpers by the relationship of the caregiver. Twenty-seven percent of 
caregivers are spouses, and approximately 32 percent are children (20.5 per- 
cent  are  non-coresident  children  and  11.3 coresident).  Grandchildren  and 
children-in-law together make up 6.5 percent of all caregivers. Other relatives 
account for 5.3 percent, and live-in help, either paid or unpaid, represents 8 
percent of the caregivers. Other individuals make up 12.5 percent of caregiv- 
6.  See Wolf, Freedman, and Soldo (1995) for a similar imputation that assigns values to these 
missing data points. 142  Kathleen McGarry 
Table 5.6  Distribution of Helper Relationships by Marital Status of Recipient 
(percent of  helpers) 
Marital Status of Recipient 








Live-in helper, paid 
Live-in helper, not paid 
Other person, paid 
Other person, not paid 
Organization, paid 
Organization, not paid 
Total” 














































‘Columns may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding. 
ers, divided evenly between paid and unpaid persons. Organizations constitute 
the remaining 9 percent, the majority of whom are paid for their services. 
This distribution varies by several factors. Respondents who are not married 
(table 5.6) obviously do not receive care from a spouse. For these individuals, 
children shoulder much of the burden, comprising 42 percent of the caregivers 
for those who are unmarried,  compared to only  16 percent for the married 
sample. The number of coresident children or children-in-law providing care 
increases dramatically among those who are unmarried, as does the proportion 
of live-in helpers. The “other person” category and the proportion of organiza- 
tions are also substantially more important among unmarried individuals. 
The choice of  caregiver also varies by  the type of limitation. In table 5.7, 
the distribution of caregivers who help with ADL limitations is shown sepa- 
rately from the distribution of those who help with IADL limitations. An indi- 
vidual can provide help with each type of task and can therefore be included 
in each column. Those helping with ADLs are far more likely to be paid help- 
ers than are those helping with IADLs. Almost 30 percent of ADL helpers are 
paid, compared with just 11 percent of IADL helpers. Spouses are equally 
likely to perform both types of help, as are coresident children, while non- 
coresident children are represented more heavily among IADL caregivers than 
among ADL providers. As one would expect given the types of activities in- 
volved, it is apparently difficult or costly for non-coresident individuals to as- 
sist with ADLs. 143  Caring for the Elderly: The Role of Adult Children 
Table 5.7  Distribution of Helper Relationships by Type of Help Provided 
(percent of helpers) 
Type of  Help” 








Live-in helper, paid 
Live-in helper, not paid 
Other person, paid 
Other person, not paid 
Organization, paid 








































Totalb  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Number of observations  2,721  753  2,346 
aA  helper may be in both columns. 
bColumns  may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding. 
Table 5.8 shows that the number of hours provided varies substantially with 
the type of caregiver. Spouses work almost “full time” at 35 hours per week 
(among those  with  positive  hours). Help from  children differs greatly  by 
whether the child coresides with the parent. Non-coresident children provide 
an  average of  8.5 hours per week, and coresident children, 38.4 hours. The 
largest average number of hours is provided by paid live-in helpers, who appar- 
ently supply help almost around the clock, averaging 114 hours in a week. 
As demonstrated in table 5.9, the individual providing the care is substan- 
tially more likely to be female than male, regardless of  the relationship be- 
tween the caregiver and the recipient. This difference is well documented in 
other studies. For example, Coward and Dwyer (1990) find that daughters are 
three times more likely to provide care to parents than are sons. My differences 
are less dramatic, but still striking. An even larger sex difference exists among 
children-in-law who provide care. Here daughters-in-law often provide care 
for their husbands’ parents whereas sons-in-law scarcely ever care for their 
spouses’ parents. Over 80 percent of the children-in-law who provide care are 
female (for additional evidence and discussion, see Stoller, Forster, and Dun- 
iho 1992). 
The results in table 5.9 are consistent with the widely held belief that daugh- 
ters are more likely to provide care than are sons. In my sample, the probability 
that a daughter of an impaired parent provides care is 0.14 compared with 0.06 
for a son (not shown). Even among those children providing care, daughters 144  Kathleen McGarry 
Table 5.8  Mean Number of Hours of Help by Relationship of Helper 
Relationship 
Mean  Standard 








Live-in helper, paid 
Live-in helper, not paid 
Other person, paid 
Other person, not paid 
Organization, paid 












































Relationship  Female 
Other relative  73.1 
Live-in helper, not paid  69.5 
Other person, paid  68.4 
Other person, not paid  63.3 
Live-in helper, paid  94.9 
provide a greater number of hours than do sons, 16.5 hours per week versus 
11.8 hours. 
Because men earn more than women in the labor market, it may be more 
efficient for sons to work additional hours and provide jnancial assistance 
rather than their time to an elderly parent. However, differences in the provi- 
sion of financial assistance by the sex of the child are small. Only 1.09 percent 
of daughters in the sample made a cash transfer to their impaired parents in 
the last year (as reported by the parents), compared with 1.07 percent of sons. 
The amounts given by daughters, however, are somewhat lower than those by 
sons. Over positive values the mean amount of the transfer was $2,119 for 
daughters and $3,345 for sons. However, because only 74 daughters and 71 
sons gave transfers, it is impossible to draw any significant conclusions from 
these numbers. In the following section I explore gender differences in care- 
giving in a multivariate context. 
While almost two-thirds of the sample who need assistance do receive help, 
a substantial portion of those with one or more ADL or IADL limitations re- 145  Caring for the Elderly: The Role of Adult Children 
ceive no help.'  One would hope that those who do not receive assistance are 
less severely impaired than their counterparts who do receive care. Table 5.10 
demonstrates the difference in the means for these two groups: those with ADL 
or IADL limitations who receive care and those with limitations who do not. 
In fact, it does appear that those not receiving care are less impaired. They 
are younger and more schooled, both characteristics that are positively corre- 
lated with health. They have  significantly fewer ADL and IADL limitations, 
are less likely to report their health status as fair or poor, and on average spent 
fewer nights in a hospital. Those who are not helped have greater income and 
more wealth. They are also significantly more likely to be married. 
5.3.3  Motivation for the Provision of Care 
Why do children provide care to a parent? One broad model holds that trans- 
fers between family members are exchange based (for a discussion of the theo- 
ries of transfers, see Cox  1987; Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff 1994). Thus 
children are perhaps providing assistance to their parents in exchange for fi- 
nancial help or the promise of  an inheritance (Bernheim, Shleifer, and Sum- 
mers  1985). However, the simple correlations provide little support for this 
theory. The higher the probability with which an individual expects to leave an 
inheritance, the lower the probability of that individual's receiving help from 
children. The correlation is -0.21  and is significantly different from zero at 
the 1 percent level. Similarly, the correlation between wealth (or the potential 
size of the estate) and the probability of receiving care from children is also 
negative, -0.12,  and significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
The transfer of cash ($S,OOO  or more) in the past  10 years to children is also 
negatively related to the probability of help from a child, and the relationship 
is significantly different from zero. There is no significant relationship between 
these variables and the probability of receiving paid help. 
Wealthier parents, even those with at least one ADL or IADL limitation, are 
likely to be in better health and therefore need less care than do poorer parents. 
Thus the simple correlations confound a number of factors. Below I control 
for many of these components of the decision simultaneously. 
5.4  Care Provided to Elderly Individuals 
Which needy elderly receive help and which must manage on their own 
depends on a number of  factors that must be controlled for simultaneously. 
Certainly, the availability of kin to provide care, and the existence of financial 
resources to purchase care, will influence whether care is received as well as 
the type of care. Similarly, the seventy of the limitation will influence care. In 
this section I examine the relationship between numerous observable charac- 
teristics of the respondent and her family and whether care is received, whether 
7.  In table 5.10,2,149 out of the 3,261 respondents, or 66 percent, receive care. If these numbers 
are scaled by sample weights, the fraction receiving care falls slightly, to 61 percent. Table 5.10  Comparison of Means 
Variable 
Impaired 
Respondents  Helped  Not Helped 
n = 3,261a  n = 2,149”  n = 1,112” 





Highest grade completed 
Health measures 
Health excellentlvery good 
Health good 
Health faidpoor 
Number of ADL limitations 
Number of  IADL limitations 
Number of nights in hospital 
Prob. of  living 10 yrsb 







Private insurance coverage 
Number of  children 
Number of  kids in  10 miles 
Married 
Live with others (incl. children) 
Family linkuges 
Prob. of leaving inheritanceb 
Child(ren) in  will 0/1 
Child(ren) on deed to home 0/1 
Value of home 
Child(ren)  beneficiaries of  life 
Face value of life insurance 
Number of  kids gave $5,000+ 
Trust for child(ren) 0/1 
Value of trust 
Number of kids gave transfer 
(last year) 
Total value of  transfers (last 
insurance 0/1 


































































































































































































Note: S.E. = standard error. 
“Number of observations for some variables differs due to missing values. 
”Means  calculated over nonmissing observations. 147  Caring for the Elderly: The Role of Adult Children 
care is purchased, and whether care is received from a non-coresident child. 
Section 5.5 looks at the decision from the caregivers' point of view and exam- 
ines which children are likely to provide care. 
Other researchers have limited their samples to unmarried individuals under 
the  assumption  that  married  people  are cared  for almost exclusively by  a 
spouse. As shown in table 5.5, this assumption is not entirely consistent with 
the data. Certainly, a spouse is the most likely caregiver, but married individu- 
als also receive help from children, as well as paid care.* Furthermore, because 
almost half (47 percent) of the sample is married, eliminating these individuals 
excludes a large part of the sample. I therefore include all individuals in the 
regressions, regardless of marital status. I control for the difference in the set 
of potential caregivers by including variables for marital status and the number 
of  children. I also allow marital status to be interacted with sex to allow for 
differential effects for male and female  respondent^.^ 
5.4.1  Receipt of Care 
I look first at the question of who among those with a limitation receives 
care. The comparison of  means showed that healthier individuals were less 
likely to receive assistance. Here I estimate a probit model that controls for a 
number of factors.I0 Included in the equation as right-hand-side  variables are 
several controls for health: the respondent's self-assessed health status (excel- 
lent or very good, good [omitted], fair or poor), her age, number of ADL limita- 
tions, number of IADL limitations, number of nights spent in a hospital in the 
past year, the respondent's self-reported probability of living approximately 10 
more years, and the reported probability of entering a nursing home in the next 
five years." 
I control for the availability of informal care by including the respondent's 
marital status, number of children, and number of daughters (because daugh- 
ters appear to be more likely to provide care). I  also include the number of 
children who live within 10 miles of the parent, and whether there are individu- 
als other than a spouse present in the home. A spouse is likely to be a primary 
8. It is likely that care from children is underestimated because the survey design tends to cap- 
ture only the primary caregiver. 
9. Estimating the model separately by marital status resulted in small changes in several coeffi- 
cients. These changes do not alter the conclusions or provide any insight into the decision process. 
I therefore present the regression estimates based on the entire sample. 
10. Results for a linear probability model are similar and are reported in an  earlier version of 
the paper. 
11. AHEAD queries respondents about an  array of diseases. The various illnesses are quite 
prevalent: 55 percent of the sample have high blood pressure, 35 percent have had a heart attack 
or  have a heart condition, and 20 percent have had a stroke. If  dummy variables indicating the 
presence of each of the noted conditions (high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart 
disease, stroke, broken hip, and surgical replacement of any joint) are included in the regressions, 
they are jointly significant at the 5 percent level, but not at the 1 percent level. The coefficients on 
the remaining variables are not altered by the inclusion of disease measures. Surprisingly, even the 
indicators of excellent or poor health are largely unchanged. To  simplify the discussion I do not 
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source of care, yet husbands may  provide a different level of  care than do 
wives. I therefore include an interaction of  sex and marital status, allowing 
married women to have a different probability of receiving care than married 
men. Similarly, I interact marital status with race to allow for differential ef- 
fects. 
To proxy the affordability  of  paid care, I include income and wealth (in 
quartiles), the existence of a private insurance policy,12  and whether the respon- 
dent was eligible for Medicaid. 
To  examine the importance of exchange, I include numerous measures that 
could serve as avenues of exchange: The number of children to whom the re- 
spondent gave $5,000 or more in the past  10 years, the number of children 
receiving cash assistance in the past year, and whether a child's name is on the 
deed to the parent's home. I also include the total amount of cash transferred 
to all children during the past year, and the value of the home if the parent has 
put a child's name on the deed. If parents are holding resources until their death 
in order to motivate attentive behavior in children, they may  do so through 
wills, life insurance, and trusts. I include variables for whether the respondent 
names a child in her will, whether she has established a trust, the value of the 
trust, whether a child is listed as a beneficiary on a life insurance policy, and 
the face value of those policies. The larger the possible inheritance, the more 
the children ought to want to please their parents, if bequests are made strategi- 
cally. Similarly, I include a variable  indicating whether the parent  owns a 
home.13 
Finally, demographic characteristics are included: age, race, sex, and school- 
ing level of the respondent. 
The estimated coefficients are reported in table 5.11 along with the deriva- 
tives evaluated at the means of the right-hand-side  variables. Significance lev- 
els are indicated by superscripts on the coefficient estimates. The results pro- 
vide strong evidence that assistance is determined in large part by need. Older 
respondents, those with a greater number of ADL or IADL difficulties, and 
those with more nights in a hospital are all significantly more likely to get help, 
with significance determined at the 5 percent level. Those in excellent health 
are significantly less likely to receive assistance. The effects, in most cases, are 
large. Each additional IADL difficulty increases the probability of assistance 
by almost 20 percentage points. The effect of ADL limitations is smaller; each 
increases the probability by only 6.4 percent. The difference between the effect 
of ADL limitations and IADL limitations on the probability of receiving help 
is perhaps due to the difficulty of providing help with personal care relative to 
housekeeping chores. 
12. Ninety-six percent of the sample had Medicare coverage, so for the majority of respondents 
this insurance is a supplement to Medicare. 
13. While these variables are certainly plausible means of exchange, they likely also measure 
the degree of closeness of the family. Future work taking advantage of the multiple observations 
within a family will attempt to disentangle the two explanations. Table 5.11  Probit Estimates for the Probability of Receiving Care and Qpe  of Care 
Variable 
Probability of  Probability of  Probability of 
Receiving Care  Paying for Care  Care from Children 






Highest grade missing 
Health measures 
Health excellent/very good 
Health good (omitted) 
Health faidpoor 
Number of ADLs 
Number of IADLs 
Number of nights in 
Prob. of living 10 yrs 
Prob. of  entering nursing 
hospital 
Prob. missing 




1st wealth quartile 
2nd wealth quartile 
3rd wealth quartile 




1  st income quartile 
2nd income quartile 
3rd income quartile 





Private insurance coverage 
Number of children 
Number of  girls 

















































-  0.06  13 
-0.0437 














































0.0020  0.0147*  0.0038 
-0.0211  -0.3348**  -0.0864 
0.0069  -0.3738**  -0.0965 
0.0008  -0.0219*  -0.0057 
0.0452  -0.0416  -0.0107 
0.0226  -0.0757  -0.0195 
0.0153  0.1679  0.0433 
0.0294  0.0004  0.001 
0.0291  0.1446**  0.0373 
0.0003  -0.0004  -0.0001 
-0.0199  0.0167  0.0043 
0.0162  -0.0437  -0.0113 
0.0253  0.1061  0.0274 
-0.0177  -0.0582  -0.0150 
-0.0384  0.2691  0.0695 
-0.0181  0.2295  0.0592 
-0.0320  0.1520  0.0392 
-0.0255  -0.1090  -0.0281 
-0.0208  -0.0531  -0.0137 
-0.0081  -0.0327  -0.0084 
-0.0472  0.1065  0.0275 
0.0492  0.0389  0.0100 
0.0016  -0.0601  -0.0155 
0.0007  0.0118  0.0030 
-0.0101  0.0376  0.0097 
-0.0028  0.3354**  0.0866 
-0.2067  -  1.2915**  -0.3334 
0.0921  0.1860  0.0480 
0.0737  0.6718**  0.1734 
-0.0982  -  1.0302**  -0.2659 150  Kathleen McGany 
Table 5.11  (continued) 
Variable 
Probability of  Probability of  Probability of 
Receiving Care  Paying for Care  Care from Children 
Coeff.  Deriv.'  Coeff.  Deriv.a  Coeff.  Deha 
Measures of exchange 
Rob. of leaving 
inheritance 
Prob. missing 
Child(ren) in will 0/1 
Child(ren) on deed to 
Value of  home ($100,000) 
Child(ren) beneficiaries of 
life insurance O/I 
Face value of life 
insurance ($lO,ooO) 
Number of kids gave 
$5,000+ (past 10 yrs) 
Trust for child(ren) O/l 
Value of  trust (million $1 
Number of kids gave 
transfer (last year) 












































-0.331  1' 
-0,2474' 
-2.1008** 
Mean of  dependent variable  0.66  0.18 
Number of observations  3,115  1,893 
0.0563  -0.1608 
0.03  I4  0.2035 
-0.0065  0.1248 
0.0460  0.2147' 
-0.0012  -0.0705 
-0.0398  0.15  1 1 
-0.0063  0.138 
-0.0124  -0.0013 
0.0144  -0.5686 
-0.0807  1.257 
0.01 19  -0.0058 
-0.0509  -0,2262' 
0.0380  -0.1270 

















aDerivatives  are evaluated at the means of the right-hand-side  variables. 
+Significant  at the 10 percent level. 
*Significant  at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Respondents could report a high probability of entering a nursing home for 
two reasons. They might believe that their health is deteriorating quickly and 
they will require the intensive care provided by  such a facility. Alternatively, 
they may have found it difficult to obtain acceptable home care. Thus the corre- 
lation between the probability of care and the probability of entering a nursing 
home could be either positive, if poor health is the motivation, or negative, if 
entrance into a nursing home is due to lack of available alternatives. In the 
regression the coefficient on potential nursing home admission is negative and 
significant at the  1 percent level, indicating that those who expect to enter a 
nursing home are currently less likely to be receiving care, everything else 
held constant. 
Other measures of informal care also play important roles in whether care 
is received, although the effects are not as strong. Being married increases the 151  Caring for the Elderly: The Role of Adult Children 
probability of  receiving care by 6.4 percentage points,  though,  as hypothe- 
sized, the  effect for married women is significantly  lower. Married  women 
have a 7.5 percentage point lower probability of receiving care than do married 
men, so the net effect of marriage for women is almost zero. There is no sig- 
nificant difference in the effect of marital status between whites and nonwhites, 
though  nonwhites  are  2 percentage  points  (insignificant)  less likely  to get 
help.I4 
Those living with someone in addition to or other than a spouse are only 2 
percentage points more likely to get care than those who do not have additional 
household members. Each additional child who lives within a 10-mile radius 
of  the parent increases the probability  of receiving care by  only 0.9 percent. 
Surprisingly, additional children (either males or females) do not significantly 
affect the probability of receiving care.I5 
The proxies for the affordability of professional care do not have a signifi- 
cant impact on whether an individual receives care. Income, health insurance, 
and Medicaid coverage are all insignificant  predictors of the receipt of care. 
The effect of wealth is nonlinear, with those in the middle quartiles being more 
likely to receive care than those in the highest quartile. 
None of the variables that proxy avenues of exchange is a significant pre- 
dictor of care received. The probability of leaving an inheritance, naming chil- 
dren in a will or as beneficiaries of life insurance policies, making cash trans- 
fers to children, either currently or in the past, establishing a trust fund, and 
the value of these transfers and future transfers are all insignificant predictors 
of assistance, and the magnitudes of the effects are small relative to the impact 
of  health  measures. Thus  it  appears that, regardless  of  family  structure or 
wealth, those who most need care are most likely to receive it. Financial status 
has almost no effect on the probability, whereas health measures have strong 
predictive power. 
5.4.2  Purchase of Care 
I now explore the source of care. In the first comparison I look at the choice 
of paid versus unpaid care. Of those who receive assistance, 18 percent pay for 
at least some of the time. I again estimate a probit model for the 66 percent of 
the impaired sample who receive some sort of care. The results are reported in 
the  second two columns of table 5.11. I am most interested in determining 
whether paid care is chosen if individuals can afford it or, conversely, whether 
those with resources are instead making transfers to children  as a means of 
14. Belgrave and Bradsher (1994) using the Longitudinal Study of Aging find that 85 percent 
of whites and only 76 percent of African Americans with an ADL limitation got help, though the 
percentages receiving help with  IADL limitations were similar. Because I combine those with 
difficulties with ADLs and IADLs I obtain a “average” estimate. 
15. The number of living brothers and sisters of  the respondent did not significantly affect the 
probability of  receiving care, and these variables were excluded from the estimation presented 
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encouraging children to provide care. If  those with money choose to “pay” 
children rather than make formal caregiving arrangements, it would suggest 
that children are the preferred caregivers. 
The measures of need are less strong predictors of the decision to purchase 
care than of whether care of any kind is received. Self-assessed health status is 
not a significant predictor of the purchase of help. Older individuals are more 
likely to pay for care, but the effect is small with an additional year worth 0.2 
percentage points on a base of  18 percent. The number of  ADL and IADL 
limitations, however, remain among the strongest predictors. Each additional 
limitation increases the probability of paid care by 2.94 percentage points for 
ADLs and 2.91 for IADLs. Table 5.7 showed that children provided help with 
IADL limitations while paid caregivers were used more frequently to assist 
with ADLs. In the probit estimates there is a small difference between the 
two types of  limitations in the probability of  receiving paid care, with ADL 
difficulties having a larger effect, although the difference is statistically insig- 
nificant. 
The presence of another individual in the home, whether a spouse or other 
person, significantly decreases the probability of paid care. Married individu- 
als have a 21 percentage point lower probability of paying for care. The impor- 
tance of marital status is significantly attenuated for both females and for non- 
whites. Respondents who live with an additional household member (other 
than a spouse) have a 10 percentage point lower probability of purchasing care. 
Based on an average probability of paying for care of  18 percent these repre- 
sent large changes. As shown earlier, those with greater ADL needs were more 
likely to rely on live-in companions or  paid care than to rely on children. Con- 
sistent with those results, the number of  children, the number of  daughters, 
and the number of  children living within 10 miles all have little explanatory 
power in this equation. 
The dummy variable indicating Medicaid coverage has a large positive ef- 
fect on the probability of paying for services. Because Medicaid pays for home 
health care and housekeeping services, such coverage often makes home care 
costless to the recipient. The change in the probability of paid care associated 
with Medicaid coverage is 5 percentage points. Individuals in lower income 
quartiles also have a lower probability of paid care as expected, although the 
point estimates are not significantly different from zero. 
As with the receipt of care, there is little evidence of exchange in the deci- 
sion to pay for care. An exchange model would predict that paid care would be 
less likely and help from a child more likely in response to the existence of an 
inheritance-a  possible payment for services from the child. However, those 
with a higher probability of leaving an inheritance have a 6 percentage point 
greater probability of paying for care. This relationship is probably the result 
of an association between the probability of  leaving a bequest and financial 
well-being, and this in turn is associated with the decision to purchase formal 
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of paid care decreases by 4 percentage points. Additional dollars transferred to 
the children also decrease the probability of paid care, although the effect is 
small. A transfer of  an additional $10,000 decreases the probability of  paid 
care by 5 percentage points. Whether a transfer is made, however, has no effect 
on the probability. 
Thus, whereas the receipt of  care is determined in large part by need, the 
use of paid assistance is driven by affordability, as measured by insurance sta- 
tus, and the availability of substitutes to paid care to assist with ADLs. A live- 
in  caregiver can substitute for paid help, but non-coresident children, even 
those who live nearby, cannot. 
5.4.3  Care from Children 
If  a respondent lives with either a spouse or child, the likelihood that this 
individual provides care is high. For non-coresident children, however, the de- 
cision is more interesting. Thus, in addition to the decision to purchase paid 
care, I explore the “choice” to receive help from non-coresident  children. I 
estimate a probit model with the left-hand-side  variable equal to one if  the 
respondent receives any care from a non-coresident child and zero if she does 
not. The covariates are identical to the previous regressions. The estimates and 
derivatives are reported in the final two columns of table 5.11. 
As is the case with the probability of paying for care, older respondents are 
more likely to get help from children. This result, in both cases, is likely due 
to the decreased availability of  a spouse, siblings, and friends with old age. 
Again, self-reported health measures do not significantly affect the decision. 
Interestingly, consistent with table 5.7, help from children is strongly related 
to the number of IADL limitations-each  limitation increases the probability 
by 4 percentage points on a base of 30-but  is not at all affected by the number 
of  ADL difficulties. Thus  again  there  is  evidence  that  children  help  with 
housekeeping tasks rather than with personal care. 
Being married and living with other individuals have the largest effects on 
receiving help from a non-coresident child. A spouse decreases the probability 
by almost 33 percentage points, and the presence of others in the household 
decreases the probability by 27 percentage points. On a base of 30 percent these 
are large changes. In this case, there is not a significantly different effect of 
marital status for women. For nonwhites, however, the effect of marriage is at- 
tenuated by 17 percentage points. The coefficient on the linear term for race is 
large and negatively related to receiving help from a child, as is the dummy vari- 
able indicating that the respondent is male. Nonwhites are 9 percentage points 
less likely to get care from a child, while men are 10  percentage points less likely. 
Neither the absolute number of children nor the number of daughters has a 
significant effect, but  the presence  of  children  within  a  10-mile radius  in- 
creases the probability of help from a child by 9 percentage points. The impli- 
cation is that only nearby children are able to provide assistance. 
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The estimates give little evidence of an exchange motive. The probability of 
leaving an inheritance, the amount of bequeathable wealth, naming children in 
a will, and naming children as beneficiaries of a life insurance policy all have 
no effect on the probability of receiving help from non-coresident children. In 
fact, wealth operates in the opposite direction: poor parents are more likely to 
get help from children, although the effects are not significant. Naming a child 
on the deed to a home increases  the probability  of  help, but cash transfers 
operate in the opposite direction. Each additional $10,000 given is associated 
with a 7 percentage point lower probability of receiving assistance. Other indi- 
cators of cash transfers are also negatively related to time assistance even after 
controlling for health. 
5.4.4  Summary of Care Received 
The results from the three regressions reported in table 5.11 describe a con- 
sistent story of the receipt of care. Whether an elderly individual gets care is a 
function of need. Those with more limitations are more likely to receive assis- 
tance, while income and wealth measures are unimportant. The choice of the 
type of care is also strongly dependent on need. Help with ADLs requires a 
live-in  companion  or professional  assistance,  while  non-coresident  children 
provide help with the housekeeping-type  services captured in the measure of 
IADL limitations. 
Assuming that difficulty with household chores precedes difficulty with per- 
sonal care, these results suggest a possible progression of caregiving services 
as an individual's health worsens. In the absence of a spouse, an elderly woman 
may first rely on children to help with tasks such as shopping. As her condition 
deteriorates and she begins to experience difficulty with personal care needs, 
she may seek to live with a child or, alternatively, purchase professional care if 
she can afford to do so. In the panel, this type of progression can be observed, 
and it presents a logical method of verifying this hypothesis. 
Surprisingly, despite the intriguing theoretical work that has been done on 
exchange motives for transfers, there appears to be little support for this hy- 
pothesis with respect to observed transfers both to and from the impaired el- 
derly. 
5.5  The Child's Perspective 
If care is to come from children, a decision must be made about which child 
will provide the care. In this section I examine the caregiving decision from 
the point of view of the child, looking for patterns associated with which child 
provides the care. 
As discussed in section 5.3, in simple comparisons, daughters appear to be 
more likely to provide care than are sons. However, there are a number of other 
factors involved. For example, the majority of the sample of elderly impaired 
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viduals may  prefer to be cared for by a same-sex child, thus increasing the 
responsibilities of daughters. Or, alternatively, if parents must “buy help” by 
financially compensating a child in order to receive care, the price of a daugh- 
ter’s time may be less than that of  a son’s due to differences in market wage 
rates for men and women. In the following regression analysis I control for as 
many of these factors as possible. All information used in the analyses is re- 
ported by the respondent; the respondent’s children were not interviewed. 
For children who live with the respondent, AHEAD obtains earnings infor- 
mation that is included in the estimated equations. For the majority of children 
(those who do not coreside with the respondent), I do not have earnings data, 
but rather family income. I use this variable to proxy the value of the child’s 
time. I also include the usual predictors of wages:  age,  sex, schooling, and 
part-time/full-time status. The opportunity cost of time is positively related to 
age, being male, schooling, and full-time status. Rather than predict wage rates 
using information from other data sets, I include these regressors directly and 
estimate a reduced-form equation. I also include a dummy variable for whether 
the child is over age 65.I6Also  important for the opportunity cost of the child‘s 
time is whether he has his own ~hi1dren.l~  I therefore include a dummy variable 
equal to one if the respondent’s child has at least one child of  his own. In 
addition to measures of family income, I include a measure of the child‘s in- 
come relative to that of the parent.l* 
To capture the possibility  of exchange, I include variables similar to those 
in  table 5.11: whether the  child is a beneficiary  of  a life  insurance policy, 
whether his name is on the deed to the parent’s house, whether he is named in 
the respondent’s will, and the probability with which the respondent expects to 
leave an inheritance. I also include the value of the respondent’s bequeathable 
wealth (in quartiles), representing the value of the potential inheritance (as well 
as the respondent’s ability to pay for professional  care), the value of the life 
insurance policy, and the equity in the home for which the child‘s name is on 
the deed. Finally, I  include variables indicating whether the child received a 
cash transfer of  $500 or more in the past year, or of $5,000 or more in the 
past 10 years. If transfers were made in the past year, I include the amount of 
these transfers.  I9 
To allow for the possibility that a well-off child may substitute cash assis- 
tance for time help (McGarry and Schoeni 1995), I include a dummy variable 
for whether the child made a transfer to the parent in the past year, and a vari- 
able indicating the amount. 
16. Similar variables for the child’s spouse (spouse’s age, schooling, and work status) were not 
significantly different from zero and are not included in the results presented here. 
17. While children make different demands on a parent at different ages, the survey does not 
obtain the ages of these grandchildren. 
18. This variable is based on a question in AHEAD that asked respondents whether their chil- 
dren were better off, the same, or worse off financially than they themselves were. It is not obtained 
by comparing reported measures of family income. 
19. The actual amount transferred over the previous 10 years is not obtained. 156  Kathleen McGarry 
If  there are social norms about who is responsible  for caring for parents, 
then birth order and the number of brothers and sisters a given child has may 
affect the probability that he provides care. I include separate dummy variables 
indicating the oldest and the youngest child and allow these variables to differ 
by the sex of the child. I also control for the number of sisters a particular child 
has interacted with the child's  sex, whether  someone is an  only child,  and, 
finally, the total number of children in the family. 
Included  also  are characteristics  of  the  respondent.  Her  age,  race,  sex, 
whether the child and the respondent  are of  the  same sex, the respondent's 
income and wealth, marital status,*O and insurance status (Medicaid and/or pri- 
vate insurance). 
The means of these variables are presented in table 5.12 for the entire sample 
of 9,056 children, and separately by whether the child provides care.21  From 
the comparison  of  means we  see that those who provide assistance are less 
likely to be married or to be male. They are older on average and less likely to 
work, both of which likely indicate the availability of time. The largest differ- 
ences are with respect to living arrangements. Children who provide care are 
much more likely to live with their parents or to live within  10 miles of their 
parents. Children who provide help are also less well off financially than their 
siblings. In addition to providing time help, these caregiving children are more 
likely to have provided cash assistance to their parents, despite the fact that 
their average incomes are lower. 
The decision of a child to provide care ought to be influenced by the amount 
of  care provided  by his siblings. However, Wolf et al. (1995) do not  find a 
significant effect of siblings'  hours on one's own supply of time help. Future 
work will explore this relationship in the AHEAD data. 
In the multivariate analysis (table 5.13) the variables that proxy the opportu- 
nity cost of the child's time do not have an effect on the probability of providing 
assistance. The magnitude of the child's  earnings if  he lives at home, or his 
family income if he does not, are not significantly different from zero, nor is 
the child's sex (exclusive of family composition), his schooling, his work sta- 
tus, or whether he has children of  his own. 
The measures of exchange offer some explanatory power, although the re- 
sults are far from conclusive. Being the beneficiary  of a life insurance policy 
20. If a child has two living parents, he may  be faced with the situation of providing care to 
both. Certainly, there are returns to  scale. It  does not  seem possible to help one's  mother with 
grocery shopping and not provide the same care to a father. I therefore experimented with includ- 
ing indicators of whether the child helps the second parent and the number of hours spent helping 
the second parent. Adding these variables improved the fit of  the regression but did not alter the 
estimated values of other coefficient%  Because fewer than 1 percent of children belong to a family 
in which both parents need  care, I exclude these variables from the final analysis. However, be- 
cause the limitations of the second parent may also prevent that parent from assisting his spouse, 
I do include the number of ADL or IADL limitations experienced by the second parent. 
21. Children-in-law were deleted lrom the sample. Four percent of caregivers are children-in- 
law. The regression results are substantially unchanged if all children-in-law (those who provide 
care and those who do not) are included in the sample, and appropriate control variables are added. Table 5.12  Comparison of Means for Children of Respondents 
All  Help  Do Not Help 
n = 9,05@  n = 921a  n = 8,135" 
Variable  Mean  S.E.  Mean  S.E.  Mean  S.E. 
Opportuniv cost 
Age  48.38 
Male  0.488 
Schooling  12.26 
Manied  0.687 
Children 0/1 
(grandchildren)  0.831 
Employedb  0.727 
Employed part time  0.085 
Earningsb (coresident 
only)  25,541 
Income measure?  (non-coresident) 
Less than $20,000 
$20,000-$3O,OOO 
$30,000-$50,000 
More than $50,000 
Less than $30.000 
More than $30,000 
Less than $50,000 
Income unknown 
Better off than parents 
Same as parents 
Worse off than parents 
Relative income missing 
Measures of  exchange 
Child in will 0/1 
Child on deed to home 0/1 
Child beneficiary of life 
insurance 0/1 
Face value of life 
insurance 
Child got $5,000+ in past 
10 yrs 0/1 
Transfer last year 
Value of transfer 
Gave parents financial 
Amount of assistance 
Accessibiliry/availability 
assistance 
Lives within 10 miles of 
Lives with parents 


























































































































































































Noret S.E. = standard error. 
dNumber  of observations for some variables differs due to missing values. 









Children 0/1 (grandchildren) 
Employed 
Employed*Female 
Employed part time 
Employment missing 
Earnings (coresident only; $10.000) 
Less than $20,000 
Income measures (non-coresident) 
$20,000-$30,000 
$30,000-$50.000 
More than $50,000 (omitted) 
Less than $30,000 
More than $30,000 
Less than $50,000 
Income unknown 
Better off than parents 
Same as parents (omitted) 
Worse off than parents 
Relative income missing 
Measures of exchange 
Child in will 0/1 
Child on deed to home 0/1 
Value of home ($100,000) 
Child beneficiary on life insurance 0/1 
Face value of life insurance ($lO,O00) 
Child got $5,000+ in past 10 yrs 0/1 
Transfer last year 
Value of  transfer ($10,000) 
Gave parents financial assistance 
Amount of assistance ($10,000) 
Proh. of  inheritance 
hob. missing 
Living arrangements 
Lives within 10 miles of parents 
Lives with parents 
Child owns home 
Probability of Providing Care 









































































0.071  I 
0.0090 Table 5.13  (continued) 
Probability of Providing Care 
Variable  Coefficient  Derivativea 
Family composition 
Number of sisters*Male 






Parent k characteristics 
Number of children 
Wealth 
1st wealth quartile (lowest) 
2nd wealth quartile 
3rd wealth quartile 
4th wealth quartile (omitted) 
1st income quartile (lowest) 
2nd income quartile 
3rd income quartile 




Private insurance coverage 
Nonwhite 
Sex 
Parent and child same sex 
Married 
Female*Mamed 
Number of ADLs 
Number of IADLs 




Mean of dependent variable 

























0.205 3* * 
-0.1646' 
-0.1214 





























-0.01  16 
-0.3320 
aDerivatives are evaluated at the means of the right-hand-side variables. 
+Significant  at the 10 percent level. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 1 percent level. 160  Kathleen McGarry 
and being listed on the deed to a home increase the probability of helping by 
3 and 4 percentage points, respectively. Other factors that could be associated 
with exchange are all insignificant predictors of assistance. Past transfers are 
positively related to help, whereas the value of  current transfers is negatively 
related. Wealth operates in the opposite direction from that predicted by  the 
strategic bequest motive. A child is 2 to 2.5 percentage points more likely to 
provide assistance if his parent is in the lowest two wealth quartiles than if she 
is in the highest quartile. 
As expected, a child is less likely to provide care to a married respondent, 
since the spouse in this case is likely the primary caregiver. 
There is no evidence that children substitute between providing  time and 
cash assistance. In fact, the more financial assistance the child gives, the more 
likely he is to give time assistance as well. Giving any cash assistance increases 
the probability of providing time assistance by 2 percentage points. Each addi- 
tional $1,000 of  cash transferred to a parent further increases the probability 
of a transfer of time by 0.5 percentage points. 
Despite the lack of significance of many of  these economic variables, the 
gender composition of the family and the number of siblings has a strong ef- 
fect. Sons begin with a 2 percentage point (insignificant) greater probability of 
helping a parent. For each sister, a son’s probability of helping is reduced by 
5.6 percentage points. Female siblings, however, increase a daughter’s proba- 
bility of helping, although the effect is small relative to that for sons and not 
significantly different from zero. Additional siblings of any sex lower the prob- 
ability of helping by  a small but significant amount, as there is likely some 
substitution between children. Oldest children of either sex are no more likely 
to provide assistance than are middle children, but the youngest child is more 
likely than children elsewhere in the family to provide care, regardless of sex. 
If the child is the youngest and male the magnitude of the effect is 2.5 percent- 
age points, compared to 1.5 if the youngest child is female. Children who are 
the same sex as the needy parent are more likely to provide care, although the 
effect is small. This difference too works in the direction of more care being 
provided by daughters than sons because approximately 66 percent of the im- 
paired elderly are female. 
Because of  the  number of  family composition  variables,  I present  some 
comparisons for sample families in table 5.14. I compare the marginal proba- 
bilities of helping for siblings in families with three children. The calculations 
make use of the following variables: male, number of  sisters interacted with 
the child’s sex, oldest interacted with sex, and youngest interacted with sex. All 
other variables are assumed constant. Using these coefficients it is possible to 
compare the marginal probability of a child’s helping in different families. For 
example, compare two particular families, one in which the order of the chil- 
dren is girl, boy, girl (GBG) and the other which is the reverse, boy, girl, boy 
(BGB). The probability  of the middle son’s helping in the first family (GBG) 
is  10 percentage points lower than the probability  of the middle daughter’s 161  Caring for the Elderly: The Role of Adult Children 
Table 5.14  Marginal Probability of Providing Help to Parent by Gender 
of Siblings 
Family  First  Second  Third 

































Notes; G = girl, B = boy. Calculations are based on the estimated coefficients: 0.0203*(Male) - 
0.0556*(Male*Num  sisters)  +  0.0056*(Female*Num  sisters)  +  0.0256*(01dest*Male)  - 
0.0038*(Oldest*Female) + 0.0245*(Youngest*Male) + 0.0152*(Youngest*Female).  Other vari- 
ables are held constant. 
helping  in the second family. If  the family is GGB the probability  that the 
youngest child provides care is just over 11 percentage points lower than if the 
family is BBG. Different  family structures yield similar results.  The differ- 
ences are large given that the mean probability of providing help is 8.5 percent. 
Despite allowing for differences in the opportunity cost of time, the prefer- 
ence of respondents for same-sex helpers, and the possibility that cash trans- 
fers by children substitute for time transfers, males continue to provide  sig- 
nificantly less assistance to infirmed  parents. The lack of  care from sons is 
strongly related to whether they have sisters. Male-only children are no less 
likely to provide care than are female-only children. I interpret this result to 
mean that, while parents will not go uncared for in the absence of daughters, 
if  there are daughters in the family, they will bear  the burden of caring for 
parents. Thus it is daughters, rather than elderly parents, who should be con- 
cerned about this result. 
5.6  Conclusion 
This paper has provided a descriptive analysis of the caregiving environment 
faced by the disabled and impaired elderly. The results are encouraging in that 
the strongest predictor of receiving care is need. Approximately two-thirds of 
those with limitations receive assistance. Those who are not receiving care are 
on average better off in several dimensions, including having greater financial 
resources and better health. In many ways the type of caregiving relationship 
depends on the recipient’s needs. Children, including non-coresident children, 
provide  assistance  with  housekeeping  tasks,  while  coresident  individuals 
(spouses, children, and others) help with personal care needs. 
An important caveat, however, is that the information reported by  the re- 162  Kathleen McGarry 
spondent is largely subjective. Needing assistance with a task is likely related 
to the availability of  help. If no help is available, an individual may manage to 
complete the task, while if help is readily  available  (e.g., from a spouse), a 
small amount of difficulty may deter the respondent from attempting the activ- 
ity on her own. 
One discouraging finding of this study is the paucity of assistance provided 
by children. Only 10 percent of children provide time help to their parents (8.5 
percent of non-coresident children). For children who do not live near a parent 
or whose hours are taken up with work and other responsibilities, the provision 
of cash assistance would be a logical substitute. However, fewer than 2 percent 
of children are reported to have made cash transfers to their impaired parents. 
Even more surprising, cash transfers are positively correlated with the provi- 
sion of  time assistance. Thus it is not the case that children who are unable to 
spend time helping a parent compensate with financial assistance. 
These results too should be interpreted with a degree of caution. Because of 
the structure of the survey, only the primary caregiver is likely to be named. 
Thus, if children are secondary caregivers (perhaps second to a spouse), they 
may be omitted. Additionally, financial assistance from children is reported by 
the parent. Although it is unlikely that the parent would intentionally misrepre- 
sent such assistance, she may forget or may not fully value gifts in kind. It is 
also possible that  a parent  is uninformed  about  financial assistance  from a 
child, for example, if a child pays bills without the parent’s knowledge. Evi- 
dence of  underreporting  of  transfers can be found by  examining data from 
the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). The HRS is based on a sample of 
individuals born between  1931 and  1941. HRS respondents are therefore ap- 
proximately  the same age as many  of  the children of AHEAD respondents. 
Approximately 9 percent of HRS respondents reportedly gave $500 or more to 
a parent or parent-in-law in the past year (McGarry and Schoeni 1997), while 
AHEAD respondents reported that just over  1 percent of  their children gave 
them financial assistance. While the results from the two surveys would not be 
expected to compare perfectly, the large differences between the two samples 
are suspicious, and perhaps due to failing memories or different valuation of 
noncash gifts. 
A number of  issues have been  raised  that  need  to be addressed in future 
work. The different patterns observed with respect to who provides help with 
ADLs and IADLs suggest that disaggregated measures of need should be ex- 
amined. A more difficult  problem  is raised by  the number  of  simultaneous 
decisions being made. If a great deal of care is required by an elderly parent, 
shared living arrangements may be the most efficient alternative other than a 
nursing home. The child with whom the parent lives will likely assume a large 
responsibility,  not only for the physical care of the parent but also for her fi- 
nancial well-being. This decision needs to be investigated. Similarly, the num- 
ber of hours supplied to a parent by one sibling ought to affect the hours pro- 
vided by the others. No attempt is made in this paper to model simultaneously 163  Caring for the Elderly: The Role of Adult Children 
the decisions of all the respondent’s offspring. This task too remains for fu- 
ture work. 
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COmment  James P.  Smith 
This paper continues the excellent recent work Kathleen  McGmy has been 
conducting on intergenerational transfers using the newly released data from 
the Health and Retirement Survey and the survey of Asset and Health Dynam- 
ics among the Oldest Old. In her prior work, she demonstrated that the charac- 
teristics of children matter (including their incomes) in the direction and mag- 
nitude of money transfers across generations. In this paper, she extends that 
work into much  more difficult terrain-the  provision  of  home care for the 
increasingly frail elderly. This is a more difficult problem in part because par- 
ents’ health status must be explicitly incorporated into the analysis since the 
provision of care is often conditioned on some negative health outcome. Bring- 
ing health conditions into the model raises a number of analytical issues not 
the least of which is the endogeneity of health. McGarry largely sidesteps these 
issues and provides instead an excellent descriptive  summary of  the primary 
patterns of exchange in her data. Given that we currently know so little about 
what the basic facts are about these exchanges between adult children and their 
impaired parents, this descriptive approach is a very useful and necessary first 
step. In light of her largely descriptive but important goals, the paper can be 
judged a success. 
But still we want more. There are two analytical models estimated in the 
paper. The first (summarized in table 5.11) estimates the probability of receiv- 
ing home care and the type of that care in a sample of  parents  with at least 
one ADL or IADL limitation. The second model (table 5.13) estimates the 
probability  of  providing home care to parents in a sample of  adult children. 
Let me discuss each in turn. 
The first question asked is what determines the provision of home care and 
the type of such care to elderly parents with at least one functional limitation. 
The first thing you notice about table 5.11 is that it sure contains a lot of esti- 
mated coefficients (there are in fact 129). While it will not win an award for 
the most coefficients estimated in one table by an economist (I might even be 
in the running for that award), it may be odds-on favorite if the criterion is the 
number of statistically insignificant  coefficients relative to estimated coeffi- 
cients. Using  conventional  statistical  standards, I count only 3  1 statistically 
significant coefficients among the 129. My strongest suggestion is that a more 
parsimonious model may be preferable, especially when so many of the vari- 
ables are attempting to measure the same thing. 
While there are plenty of variables in this model, on closer inspection there 
are really only three concepts being proxied-(  1) the health status of parents, 
(2) their command over resources (e.g., income and wealth), and (3) the nature 
of the relationship between parents and their adult children. This trichotomy 
James P.  Smith is senior economist at RAND and holds the RAND Chair in Labor Markets and 
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serves as a useful  device for summarizing the principal conclusions of  the 
paper. 
The evidence on the first concept is quite easy to summarize. Parents who 
receive help are much more likely to be  sick. On average, they are in poor 
health  and are beset with all sorts of ADL and IADL problems. While it is 
quite useful to document the nature of this association between parents’ need 
for help and the care they receive, it certainly does not come as a surprise and 
may even border on a tautology. 
Unfortunately, the evidence on the second concept is just as easy to summa- 
rize. In sharp contrast to health status, in this case the simplest summary state- 
ment is that income appears not to matter much in the provision of  care for 
elderly persons. At first and even second blush,  the absence of  any role for 
such a core economic variable as income is disturbing, especially in a paper 
by an economist at an economics conference. But the absence of any signifi- 
cant effect may simply be a result of the way the analysis has been set up. In 
order to be included in the sample for this analysis, the parent had to have at 
least one ADL or IADL limitation. But it is through this conditioning statement 
that  income  is most  likely  to operate.  In recent  work  (Kington  and  Smith 
1997), I have shown that income strongly influences (negatively) the number 
of  functional limitations and does so in a highly  nonlinear way.  In essence, 
increases in household income decrease the probability  of being included in 
McGany’s analytical sample. 
There is in fact a silent selection mechanism at work in all McGarry’s empir- 
ical models that makes it difficult to interpret her results. Although she does 
not model this selection process, it is nothing more than the standard sample 
selection  model  where the probability  of  sample inclusion  is estimated and 
included as a covariate. Since income reduces the probability of sample inclu- 
sion, high-income households who remain in the sample must have some unob- 
servable factor that leads the parents to be sicker than expected. This selection- 
induced correlation between income and parents’ health biases all variables in 
McGany’s analysis. This selection contamination is even more problematic in 
the analyses in the third and fifth columns of table 5.11. For example, in the 
third column, a person is included only if he had an ADL and received some 
sort of care. These remaining observations are clearly sickly, and many of them 
probably had long histories of illness. 
The final concept underlying  her model attempts to capture the nature of 
the relationship between parents and children. These variables  are the most 
theoretically  oriented as they  are meant to capture some salient motives for 
exchange  that  appear  in  the  economic  literature.  The basic  idea  is  to  see 
whether strategic bequest motives can be isolated where children attempt to 
manipulate their frail parents’ future inheritance by providing some help now. 
McGarry makes the somewhat strong claim that her results reject the notion of 
exchange. In the empirical execution  of her idea, it becomes quite difficult 
to interpret her results  because there are so many  similar empirical proxies 166  Kathleen McGarry 
competing to measure the same concept. For example, her empirical proxies 
include the probability of leaving an inheritance, the number of children who 
received $5,000 or more in the past  10 years, the number of  children who 
received cash assistance in the past year, whether children are mentioned in the 
will, whether they are the beneficiaries of life insurance, whether they have a 
deed to the parents’ home, whether a trust has been established, and so on. 
Given this feverous competition, it may not be so surprising that there is not 
one clear-cut winner. 
The paper  finishes  with  an  alternative  analysis  that  examines  these  ex- 
changes from the child’s point  of  view  (table 5.13). The issue here is  not 
whether parents receive care but whether a particular child supplies home care. 
In this analysis, the characteristics of children-other  than their sex and num- 
ber-apparently  do not matter all that much. Among the factors that do not 
matter are children’s incomes. The only “exchange”  variables that enter sig- 
nificantly into the model are whether the child was named on a deed to a home 
and whether the child is the beneficiary of a life insurance policy. Once again, 
any confidence that one is onto something is tempered by the absence of statis- 
tical significance for all the other exchange variables. 
While this is a useful start on an analysis of home care from the children’s 
point of view, I would like to suggest a somewhat different modeling strategy. 
The reason for my suggestion is a strong conviction  that family effects are 
dominant for outcomes  measuring care for parents.  Some families are very 
close and caring, and, unfortunately, other families are not. Many children in 
the former families will join in the care of their elderly parents, while none of 
them may in the latter. Unless these family differences are controlled for (say, 
through family fixed effects), it will simply be very difficult to isolate substitu- 
tion possibilities among family members. 
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